Massif: Interactive Interpretation of Adversarial Attacks on Deep
  Learning by Das, Nilaksh et al.
Massif: Interactive Interpretation of
Adversarial Attacks on Deep Learning
Nilaksh Das*
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
nilakshdas@gatech.edu
Robert Firstman
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
rfirstman6@gatech.edu
Haekyu Park*
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
haekyu@gatech.edu
Emily Rogers
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
Emily.Rogers@gtri.gatech.edu
Zijie J. Wang
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
jayw@gatech.edu
Duen Horng (Polo) Chau
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
polo@gatech.edu
Fred Hohman
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, GA, USA
fredhohman@gatech.edu
*Authors contributed equally.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored.
For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
CHI ’20 Extended Abstracts, April 25–30, 2020, Honolulu, HI, USA.
© 2020 Copyright is held by the author/owner(s).
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6819-3/20/04.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3334480.3382977
Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly powering
high-stakes applications such as autonomous cars and
healthcare; however, DNNs are often treated as “black
boxes” in such applications. Recent research has also re-
vealed that DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks, raising serious concerns over deploying DNNs in the
real world. To overcome these deficiencies, we are develop-
ing MASSIF, an interactive tool for deciphering adversarial
attacks. MASSIF identifies and interactively visualizes neu-
rons and their connections inside a DNN that are strongly
activated or suppressed by an adversarial attack. MASSIF
provides both a high-level, interpretable overview of the
effect of an attack on a DNN, and a low-level, detailed de-
scription of the affected neurons. MASSIF’s tightly coupled
views help people better understand which input features
are most vulnerable and important for correct predictions.
Author Keywords
Deep learning interpretability, adversarial attack, visual ana-
lytics, scalable summarization, attribution graph
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated signifi-
cant success in a wide spectrum of applications [3, 5, 6, 9].
However, they have been found to be highly vulnerable to
adversarial attacks: typically small, human-imperceptible
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perturbations on inputs that fool DNNs into making incor-
rect predictions [2, 4, 8, 11]. This jeopardizes many DNN-
based technologies, especially in security and safety-critical
applications such as autonomous driving and data-driven
healthcare. To make deep learning more robust against
such malicious attacks, it is essential to understand how the
attacks permeate DNN models [12, 14]. Interpreting, and
ultimately defending against adversarial attacks, is nontrivial
due to a number of challenges:
C1. Scaling to large datasets. Since DNNs contain thou-
sands of neurons and connections, summarizing how
an attack affects a model requires analyzing the model’s
behavior over entire datasets and developing scalable
representations that characterize the attack [1, 7].
C2. Entangled features and connections between be-
nign and attacked inputs. A natural approach for
understanding adversarial attacks is to compare a
model’s operations on benign and attacked inputs,
which could help people understand where and why
predictions within a model diverge. However, designing
an effective comparison can be challenging because
the features contributing to the differences may cor-
relate with one or more features in both the benign
and attacked classes. For example, Figure 1 shows
that a feature representing “ivory face with dark eyes
and nose” (center purple node) is important for both
the benign panda class and the attacked armadillo
class. This shared feature correlates with a feature for
panda (e.g., “black & white patches”), while also corre-
lating with a few features for armadillo (e.g., “scales”,
“crossed pattern”).
C3. Diverse feature vulnerability. Given an adversarial
attack, some learned features may be more easily ma-
nipulated and vulnerable than others. For example,
Figure 1: Adversarial attacks confuse DNNs to make incorrect
predictions, e.g., attacking benign panda images so they are
misclassified as armadillo. We aim to understand where such
attacks occur inside the model and what features are used.
manipulating a “basketball” feature into an “orange”
feature is easier (similar shape and color) than chang-
ing it into a “truck” feature. As features exhibit a spec-
trum of vulnerability, enabling users to visualize and
understand an attack under varying levels of severity
could help them design stronger countermeasures.
Contributions
To address the aforementioned challenges, we are develop-
ing MASSIF, an interactive visualization tool for interpreting
adversarial attacks on deep learning models. Our ongoing
work presents the following contributions:
1. Novel graph-based comparison. To discover the
features and connections activated or suppressed by
an attack, we adapt the recently proposed attribution
graph [7] in a novel way to visualize, summarize, and
compare a model’s response to benign and attacked
data. The original attribution graph aims to highlight
how a model’s learned features interact to make predic-
tions for a single class, by representing highly activated
neurons as vertices and their most influential connec-
tions as edges. Our main idea for MASSIF is to generate
and integrate two attribution graphs: one for the benign
data and another for the attacked data, as illustrated in
Figure 1. The aggregated graph helps us understand
which features are shared by both benign and attacked
data (e.g., purple, center feature in Figure 1), which are
solely activated by the benign data (blue, far left), and
which are by the attacked data (red, far right). Impor-
tantly, MASSIF also helps users more easily discover
where a prediction starts to “diverge”, honing in to the
critical parts of the model that the attack is exploiting.
2. Fractionation of neurons based on vulnerability. To
help users prioritize their inspection of neurons, we de-
velop a new way to sort and group them based on their
vulnerability, i.e., “how easily can a neuron be activated
or suppressed by an attack.” Our main idea is to vary an
attack’s strength (or severity) and record all neuron acti-
vations. Neurons that are easily activated or suppressed
by solely a weak attack may warrant focused inspection
since they can be easily manipulated with little effort.
Figure 2: Each neuron in an
attribution graph is represented
with its feature visualization. When
a user hovers over a neuron,
example dataset patches are
shown for context.
System Design and Implementation
This section describes MASSIF’s interface and visualization
design (see Figure 3). Users can select a benign class, an
attacked class, and the type and severity of an attack from
the top control panel (Figure 3A). Then, MASSIF generates
attribution graphs using a Python backend, and displays
them to the user in a web-based interface built with HTML,
CSS, JavaScript, and D3 (Figure 3B).
Nodes: Features activated (or suppressed) by attacks.
In attribution graphs, nodes represent DNN neurons which
are trained to detect particular features in input data. To in-
terpret what features a neuron detects, MASSIF represents
each neuron with its feature visualization: a synthesized im-
age that maximizes the neuron’s activation [10]. Users can
hover over any neuron’s feature visualization to also display
example image patches from the dataset that most activate
that neuron. For example, as seen in Figure 2, the feature
visualization (left) and dataset examples (right) describe a
neuron that detects a dotted pattern in scales.
We divide an attribution graph’s neurons into three groups
by their attack response. First, suppressed neurons are
highly activated by benign inputs but become suppressed
by adversarial inputs. These represent crucial features for
the benign class, but the model fails to detect them when
exposed to the attack. Second, emphasized neurons are
not noticeably activated by benign inputs but become highly
activated by adversarial inputs. These represent features
that are typically not important for the benign class, but the
model detects them as important features of the attacked
class. Third, shared neurons are highly activated by and
important to both benign and adversarial inputs.
We visually distinguish these three neuron groups with dif-
ferent colors and positions in the attribution graph view (Fig-
ure 3B). Suppressed neurons are colored blue and posi-
tioned on the left (Figure 3B.1). Emphasized neurons are
colored orange and positioned on the right (Figure 3B.3).
Shared neurons are colored purple and positioned in the
middle between suppressed neurons and emphasized neu-
rons (Figure 3B.2). The result is a visualization that disen-
tangles and compares the DNN features and connections
from the benign and attacked data.
Figure 3: The MASSIF interface. A user Hailey is studying the targeted Fast Gradient Method (FGM) attack performed on the
InceptionV1 model. Using the control panel (A), she selects “giant panda” as the benign class and “armadillo” as the attack tar-
get class. MASSIF generates an attribution graph (B), which shows Hailey the neurons within the network that are suppressed in
the attacked images (B1, blue), shared by both benign and attacked images (B2, purple), and emphasized only in the attacked
images (B3, orange). Each neuron is represented by a node and its feature visualization (C). Hovering over any neuron dis-
plays example dataset patches that maximally activate the neuron, providing stronger evidence for what a neuron has learned
to detect. Hovering over a neuron also highlights its most influential connections from the previous layer (D), allowing Hailey to
determine where in the network the prediction diverges from the benign class to the attacked class.
Fractionation: Characterizing neuron vulnerability.
Within each group of neurons, we further distinguish them
based on their vulnerability. A neuron is considered more
vulnerable if its activation changes greatly under weaker at-
tacks. We encode neuron vulnerability using its position and
color within its group. More vulnerable neurons are located
closer to shared neurons, since they are on the border of
the benign and attacked classes, and cause misclassifica-
tion under weaker attacks. Suppressed neurons that are
closer to the border with shared neurons are colored pur-
ple/blue, and emphasized neurons that are closer to the
border with shared neurons are colored purple/orange.
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Figure 4: Edges in an attribution
graph represent influential
connections between neurons.
(A) above shows a part of an
attribution graph from Figure 3D.
An emphasized neuron is
connected to one shared neuron
(purple) and three emphasized
neurons (orange) from the
previous layer. (B) shows how the
same part of the attribution graph
looks different for benign images.
The three emphasized neurons in
the previous layer are not activated
by the benign inputs, which causes
the emphasized neuron in the
current layer to be less activated.
Edges: Explaining why features are activated (or sup-
pressed). In attribution graphs, edges represent influen-
tial connections between neurons that most interact with
each other to represent a particular class [7]. These con-
nections can explain why an adversarial feature is detected
and why some features are suppressed using attribution.
With MASSIF, users can interactively visualize attribution,
i.e., drilling down into specific subgraphs by hovering over
a neuron and highlighting its previous connections which
maximally influence the neuron’s activation (Figure 3D).
When inspecting a particular emphasized neuron n, the
highlighted connected neurons from the previous layer will
be either shared neurons or other emphasized neurons, as
seen in Figure 4A. Users can observe that the connected
emphasized neurons from the previous layer contribute
highly to the activation of neuron n. Similarly, to understand
why a feature becomes suppressed by an attack, inspecting
a particular suppressed neuron m highlights its connected
neurons from the previous layer. These will be either shared
neurons or suppressed neurons. The neuron m is less ac-
tivated since the influential neurons from the previous layer
are no longer activated, i.e., they are suppressed as well.
Preliminary Results
We present usage scenarios showing how MASSIF can
help users better understand adversarial attacks on deep
learning models. Our user Hailey is studying a targeted
version of Fast Gradient Method [4] applied on the Incep-
tionV1 model [13]. The model is trained on the ImageNet
dataset, which contains over 1.2 million images across
1,000 classes. Using the control panel (Figure 3A), she
selects “giant panda" as the benign class and “armadillo" as
the target class. She sets the maximum attack strength 3.5.
Which neurons are attacked? Hailey starts by finding
which specific neurons are attacked to narrow down the
part of the model to investigate. In the attribution graph
view (Figure 3B), she hovers over the suppressed neurons
(Figure 3B.1) and the emphasized neurons (Figure 3B.3).
She sees which features are emphasized and suppressed
using the neuron feature visualization and dataset example
patches. Exploring these features, she finds the mixed5a
layer interesting because three emphasized neurons (223,
698, and 128) in mixed5a look related to armadillo skin
patterns (Figure 3C). She decides to focus on these em-
phasized neurons in mixed5a.
Which neurons are easily attacked? To efficiently de-
vise a countering defense, Hailey wants to prioritize the
neurons and investigate them in order. She knows that
MASSIF fractionates the neurons according to how easily
they are attacked; therefore, she checks how the empha-
sized neurons in mixed5a are separated (Figure 3C). By
hovering over the neurons from left to right, she observes
that “scales pattern” is most vulnerable, followed by “bas-
kets” and “bumpy texture” neurons. She decides to explore
the neurons in this order, since she presumes that it is more
efficient to protect more vulnerable neurons.
Why are these neurons attacked? Hailey now wants
to know how to protect the attacked neurons related to ar-
madillo skin patterns. She sequentially observes the attri-
bution for the “scales pattern”, “baskets”, and “bumpy tex-
ture” neurons. Upon inspecting the “bumpy texture” neuron
(Figure 3D), MASSIF shows that four neurons in the pre-
vious layer are highly interacting with it: a shared neuron
representing “black circle,” and emphasized neurons repre-
senting “spider legs”, “granular texture”, and “a white hairy
dog’s face.” As the three emphasized neurons in the previ-
ous layer can be the primary reason behind the detection of
“bumpy texture”, she decides to investigate these neurons
more using MASSIF.
Ongoing Work
Interactive neuron editing. MASSIF currently visualizes
the neurons that are activated or suppressed by an attack
under varying degrees of severity. We are working on ex-
tending MASSIF’s interactivity by allowing real-time neuron
editing, e.g., deletion. This would allow a user to actively
identify vulnerable neurons using our visualization and in-
teractively remove them from the DNN to observe its effect
in real-time. Neuron deletion would mask the activations
of a particular neuron, potentially preventing the malicious
effect of a targeted attack to propagate deeper into the net-
work. This would enable a user to preemptively edit a DNN
to enhance its robustness to adversarial attacks. For ex-
ample, a user may identify and choose to delete a shared
neuron that only feeds into emphasized neurons, prevent-
ing adversarially activated neurons from having any effect
in the subsequent layers of the network, thus thwarting the
targeted attack from succeeding.
Planned evaluation. We plan to evaluate the effective-
ness of our visualization tool coupled with interactive neu-
ron editing through in-lab user studies where participants
seek to increase the robustness of a large-scale, pretrained
DNN model. We will recruit students with basic knowledge
of deep learning models. All participants will be asked edit
the DNN for different benign-attacked class pairs and will
be evaluated on the basis of reduction in targeted attack
success rate. We will also conduct pre-test and post-test
surveys to evaluate whether MASSIF gave any deeper in-
sights into the failure modes of the studied DNN and what
factors the participants considered while editing the DNN to
increase its robustness to adversarial attacks.
Conclusion
We present MASSIF, an interactive system we are develop-
ing that visualizes how adversarial attacks permeate DNN
models and cause misclassification. MASSIF generates and
visualizes multiple attribution graphs as a summary of what
features are important for a particular class (e.g., benign or
attacked class) and how the features are related. MASSIF
enables flexible comparison between benign and attacked
attribution graphs, highlighting where and why the attribu-
tion graphs start to diverge, ultimately helping people better
interpret complex deep learning models, their vulnerabili-
ties, and how to best construct defenses.
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